[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's (vormart.)
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and of the engagements which His Highness, my late father-that is, Zia-ul-millat-wa- ud-din, who has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb-concluded and acted upon with the exalted British Government, I also have actel, an acting, and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise."
3. In practice we have never attempted to enforce our "control"
very strictly. We have no European representative at Cabul, and our Indian Mahommedan agent does not command much prestige or influence. We have, in fact, been content to leave the Ameer alone so long as he avoided serious political intercourse with any other State. We even agreed in 1907 (article 3 of Afghan section of Anglo-Russian Convention of the 31st August, 1907), to the establishment of direct relations between Afghan and Russian frontier officials "for the settlement of local questions of a no-political character." But as the Ameer has never accepted the Afghan section of the convention of 1907, this provision has remained inoperative.
4. During the war the outward manifestation of our power to control the Ameer's foreign relations has not been very impressive. We have had to put up, month after month, with the presence of German and Turkish agents at Cabul, and to look on as passive spectators at their endeavours to induce the Ameer to take up arms against us. But the fact remains that all these endeavours have failed, and that the Ameer, despite continued pressure, has adhered to the policy of neutrality which he adopted at the beginning of the war. He has, moreover, rendered as positive assistance by exercising a restraining influence over the border tribesmen during the recent disturbances on the north-west frontier. His attitude has, in fact, afforded a notable viudication of our policy towards Afghanistan during the past thirty-seven years, and it is probable that Anglo-Afghan relations stand on as firm a basis to-day as at any period since 1880.
5. As regards the status of Afghans in foreign countries, His Majesty's Govern- ment have always taken the view that the assumption of control over the Ameer's foreign relations carried with it a certain degree of responsibility for the welfare of his subjects when living or travelling abroad. Our policy on this point has been embodied in the following formula:-
His Majesty's Government, by reason of their treaty engagements with the Ameer of Afghanistan, are under the obligation, when their assistance is invoked, to intervene for the protection of Afghan subjects abroad."
6. It may be added that the Ameer of Afghanistan receives a subsidy from the Government of India of the amount of over 120,000l. per annum.
India Office, October 29, 1917.
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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(No. 784.
C
O
7053
[January 1, 1918, į
SECTION 1.
REC
REG 8 FEB 18
No.
Sir C. Greene to Mr. Balfour. --(Received January 1, 1918.)
Confidential.) Šir,
Tokyo, November 13, 1917. ABOUT two years ago, when Great Britain was an object of Japanese criticism, frequently of a most unfriendly character, the question of the revision, or even the abrogation, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was widely ventilated in this country. Since then this topic, though occasionally touched on, has sunk into the journalistic background, but the United States-Japan exchange of notes recognising the latter's special interests in China has been the signal for the revival in one or two quarters of the subject of the revision of the Alliance agreement.
An instance is to be found in a paragraph which appeared on the 9th instant in a leading commercial paper, the "Chugwai Shogyo Shimpo," which reads in translation as follows:--
FF
The revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the foundation of Japan's foreign policy, is a question frequently discussed in the past. Not only does the Alliance in question complete its term on the 13th July, 1921, but to day, as compared with the period of its conclusion, Japan's position in Eastern Asia has undergone immense changes. The actual situation is that the peace of Eastern Asia is now solely sustained by the effective power of this Empire. At the present juncture, therefore, it is only natural that there should be a necessity for the revision of the Alliance agreement. In particular, despite the fact that by the present exchange of diplomatic notes between the Japanese and American Governments Japan's position in China is authenticated in a concrete form, the actual status of Japan is not definitely recognised in a direct manner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance agreement, which should form the basis of the Empire's diplomacy. Such a circunstance creates an impression of inconsistency with the progressive changes in the general tendencies of the world and with the realities of the East-Asiatic situation. Moreover, it is to be apprehended that misunderstandings between the two countries may be thereby provoked. The view has therefore come to be advocated in influential quarters that revision is now essential. The Government authorities are also of course devoting due consideration to this point. In November 1915, however, Great Britain declared she would not take any political measures in China without consulting Japan, and, again, the British Government are fully alive to the spirit of the present exchange of notes between Japan and America. Moreover, England is to-day labouring single-heartedly to utilise the Alliance. Consequently the view also prevails that the opening of such negotiations at this juncture would be liable rather to give rise to misapprehensions, and that the present moment is thus not opportune. it is a fact that as yet no concrete step is being taken by the Government es such; but under the impulse of the present exchange of notes between Japan and America the question of the revision of the Alliance has come, it is said, to be regarded in various quarters as having marked importance."
On the following day the "Japan Times,” paper having an official connection, published the enclosed paragraph. Using the same materials, it makes in parts identical references to the revision of the Alliance; but it gives more prominence to Sir E. Grey's so-called declaration regarding China of November 1915, which subject merits a word of comment.
R
When some time since the American Minister at Peking offered his advice to the Chinese Government to compose their differences, treating the war as of secondary importance, the immediate attention paid in Japan to this minor incident and the disproportionate outery, apparently initiated or encouraged by the Japanese Government in the Japanese press, were interpreted by some observers as a manoeuvre to elicit from the American Government au undertaking not to approach the Chinese Government on a political issue without consulting Japan, on the lines of the communication made to the Japanese Government by Sir E. Grey in November 1915.
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